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Abstract: One typical aim of responsibilist virtue epistemology 
is to employ the notion of intellectual virtue in pursuit of an 
ameliorative epistemology. This paper focuses on “political 
inquiry” as a case study for examining the ameliorative value of 
intellectual virtue. The main claim is that the case of political 
inquiry threatens to expose responsibilist virtue epistemology in 
a general way as focusing too narrowly on the role of individual 




A central project of responsibilist virtue epistemology (RVE) is to develop “maps” or 
“perspicuous representations” of intellectual virtues, such as intellectual humility, 
intellectual courage, open-mindedness, and curiosity. The basic idea is to develop 
empirically grounded characterizations of epistemically admirable or praiseworthy 
individual character traits and to use these characterizations as guidance in an ameliorative 
epistemology, sometimes with the aim of informing education theory. 
 To take a few examples, Jason Baehr characterizes the “open-minded” person as 
someone who is “willing…to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to…take 
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seriously a distinct cognitive standpoint” (2011, 152). Heather Battaly characterizes the 
“epistemically humble” person as someone who is “disposed to recognize her own 
fallibility, and to recognize and value the epistemic abilities of others…” (Battaly 2014, 
194). James Montmarquet characterizes the “epistemically courageous” person as someone 
who has the disposition to “persevere in the face of opposition from others (until one is 
convinced that one is mistaken)…” (Montmarquet 1993, 23). And Roberts and Wood 
characterize the “epistemically autonomous” person as someone who has the “proper 
ability to think for herself and not be… improperly dependent on or influenced by others” 
(Roberts & Wood 2007, 259). 
 In many ways, this work is an exciting new development in epistemology. It 
highlights possible avenues for widening the traditional epistemological project. It reveals 
some of the complex ways in which epistemology and ethics seem to overlap. It also raises 
numerous questions. For example, what is the relationship between the intellectual and 
moral virtues? What is the relationship between intellectual virtue and knowledge? What 
about truth? These and related questions have been discussed in depth in recent years 
(Zagzebski 1996; Greco 2010; Simion et. al forthcoming). Another set of questions, which 
has received less attention, concerns the ameliorative value of the mapping project: can 
and should we really try to improve the intellectual character of individuals? To what 
extent? And in what sorts of contexts?  
 These latter questions are the starting point of the present paper. I will focus as a 
case study on the context of political inquiry, the acquisition of political knowledge. 
Researchers in political science, economics, and public choice theory have amassed a large 
amount of evidence that suggests citizens of large representative democracies are decidedly 
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not very good at learning about, and staying informed about, political issues. I’m interested 
in the extent to which trying to improve individuals’ intellectual character is a way of 
promoting knowledge acquisition in this context. My main claim is that the case of political 
inquiry threatens to expose RVE in a general way as focusing too narrowly on the role of 
individual intellectual virtue in attempting to improve our epistemic practices.  
 To be sure, there are other reasons to be pessimistic about the role of intellectual 
virtues in ameliorative epistemology. Perhaps most centrally, RVE has come under attack 
for theorizing with tools that are too loosely connected to the truth (Greco 2010, Carter and 
Gordon 2014, Montmarquet 1987, Madison 2017, Rowbottom 2011; cf. Kwong 2017). 
However, as we’ll see in more detail below, one of the interesting things about the context 
of political inquiry is that it seems like an especially good case for RVE. Indeed, it is 
increasingly common to hear discussion of the need for greater open-mindedness, 
conscientiousness, and intellectual autonomy amongst citizens in political discourse. What 
the present paper adds to more ordinary forms of pessimism about RVE is the claim that 
RVE is in trouble even in an especially promising case. 
 Here is the plan. Section 2 draws a preliminary distinction situating this paper 
within a body of related work already being done by proponents of RVE. Section 3 
introduces some empirical research on political knowledge and explains why this looks 
like fertile ground for the ameliorative aims of RVE. Section 4 offers some reasons for 
pessimism about the ameliorative value of individual intellectual virtue in this context. 
Section 5 turns to some positive suggestions for developing a framework that also focuses 
on non-agent-centered ways of promoting knowledge acquisition. Section 6 takes a step 
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back and presents two arguments for the claim that the context of political inquiry is an 
especially interesting and important case study for RVE. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Varieties of Non-Agent Centered Epistemology   
Proponents of RVE already tend to emphasize the importance of non-agent centered 
considerations in an ameliorative epistemology. For example, consider work being done at 
the intersection of virtue epistemology and education theory (Baehr forthcoming; Battaly 
2013; Kidd 2015; Pritchard 2015; Tanesini 2016; Watson 2015). Surely such work is non-
agent-centered, in the sense that education is a social and institutional practice. To help 
sharpen my focus, let me distinguish between two ways ameliorative epistemology can be 
“non-agent-centered.”  
 First, ameliorative epistemology can be non-agent centered in a causal sense. An 
ameliorative epistemology is causally non-agent-centered to the extent that it focuses on 
the role that social and environmental factors play in making individuals better at 
knowledge acquisition. The paradigm example is education, but we might also include 
things like public service programs, and other structural elements of communities.1   
 
1 Much RVE is non-agent-centered in this sense. A recent paper by Heather Battaly argues that “the role of 
the self in character development and rehabilitation is not as exalted as we might have thought…[her] hope 
is that we will explore ways to design environments so that they support the development of virtues and the 
erosion of vices” (Battaly 2016, 221). Discussing the notion of “epistemic corruption”, Ian Kidd argues 
“epistemic corruption occurs when an agent comes to develop or exercise one or more epistemic vices due 
their interaction with a social environment” (Kidd 2018). Jason Baehr recently helped found an actual 
school—the Intellectual Virtues Academy of Long Beach—that focuses specifically on educating for 
virtues (http://www.ivalongbeach.org/). Numerous edited volumes and special issues have been dedicated 
to questions surrounding the acquisition of intellectual virtue, the rehabilitation of intellectual vice, and the 
role of social and environmental factors in those processes (Baehr 2016; Fairweather & Flanigan 2014). 
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 Second, ameliorative epistemology can be non-agent centered in a constitutive 
sense. An ameliorative epistemology is constitutively non-agent-centered to the extent that 
it focuses on the role that social and environmental factors play in individuals’ knowledge 
acquisition. Here, the role of the individual in their own knowledge acquisition shares a 
seat with, or perhaps even takes a back seat to, the role that structural elements of 
environments, institutions and other social relations themselves play in promoting 
knowledge acquisition in individuals. An example of such a constitutive structural impact 
on knowledge acquisition might be how personalized search algorithms on internet 
browsing affect the way individuals acquire information. Focusing on such algorithms—
for example by engaging with regulation issues—might be one way an ameliorative 
epistemology could exhibit a non-agent-centered element in the constitutive sense.  
 There are ways structural and social factors can impact knowledge acquisition 
which seem to fit uneasily on either side of this distinction. For example, studies have 
suggested that better lighting in classrooms improves student performance (Veitch & 
McColl 2001). Perhaps greater exposure to natural sunlight can play a causal role in making 
individuals become better inquirers (during the education process, for example). But 
perhaps it can also play a constitutive role in individuals’ epistemic abilities under certain 
circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this paper to get into a detailed discussion of the 
metaphysics of the present distinction. It is enough to point out that an epistemology aiming 
at promoting individuals’ epistemic abilities, whether through social and institutional 
means or otherwise, may nevertheless count as agent-centered in my constitutive sense. 
Acknowledging the causal importance of social and structural factors in promoting 
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knowledge acquisition is not yet to acknowledge the constitutive importance of social and 
structural factors in promoting knowledge acquisition. 
 Unless stated otherwise, when I talk about non-agent-centered ways of promoting 
knowledge acquisition, I will mean constitutively non-agent-centered.2  
 
3. Political Ignorance  
What exactly is political knowledge? Start with the idea of a political belief: 
 
 Political belief: Any belief that is of direct relevance to decision making on 
 political issues (such as whether to increase the national deficit, foreign aid, or to 
 have public health care).3  
 
2 Others have pursued a broadly similar topic in different contexts. Perhaps most closely related, Elizabeth 
Anderson (2015) argues that epistemic justice (cf. Fricker 2007) is a virtue of social institutions. Roughly, 
her claim is that certain kinds of individual biases are epistemically neutral, or perhaps even epistemically 
useful, in certain contexts. But under the right social circumstances, they can become “vectors for epistemic 
injustice”. Thus, her aim is to make a friendly addition to Fricker’s framework (it should be noted that Fricker 
is herself aware of the potential need for such additions), and claims that properly engaging with problems 
of epistemic injustice requires engaging with social mechanisms at the institutional level. Relatedly, but more 
specifically focused on “de-biasing strategies”, Tim Kenyon (2014) argues that “false polarization bias” can 
only adequately be mitigated at an institutional level; expecting individuals to be able to monitor and adjust 
themselves for false polarization tendencies are (hopelessly) unrealistic. Most radically, Sally Haslanger 
(2015) has argued that the very project of social critique (engaging with social injustice issues such as racism, 
sexism, and the like) should not be particularly concerned with individual biases. Rather, structural factors—
such as allocation of resources, and parental leave policies in the workplace—are the “primary source” of 
social injustice. Below I will draw on some of these writers’ examples and positive suggestions. 
3 The boundaries of what counts as a political belief will be vague and broad. But there are nevertheless clear-
cut examples (such as those listed above). A fuller treatment this issue would grapple with the prospect of 
making a principled delineation. For example, it seems plausible that a normative component could be added 
to the above definition. That is to say, it seems plausible that political beliefs are those that should (in some 
sense) be of direct relevance to one’s political decision making. This issue would take us too far afield. 
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By “decision making on political issues” I mean decisions such as who to vote for, or 
whether to vote in favour of passing a bill. These are two examples of decisions that are 
obviously made by people occupying different roles within a political system. In this paper 
I focus on the political beliefs of citizens; so political beliefs in this paper can, unless stated 
otherwise, be limited to the class of beliefs directly relevant to the decision-making process 
of an individual citizen deciding who to vote for. 4  Political beliefs can have either 
descriptive or normative content. A specific example of a descriptive political belief is the 
belief that the current Conservative government budget proposal will cut taxes for the 
wealthiest 10%. An example of a normative political belief is the belief that the current 
Conservative government budget proposal should cut taxes for the wealthiest 10%.5 We 
can say that any political belief that meets the standards of knowledge (truth, justification, 
modal safety, etc.) is political knowledge. 
 A large amount of evidence has been amassed over the last 60 years (or more) that 
seems to imply that citizens of large representative democracies are decidedly not very 
good at acquiring political knowledge. Here are some quick examples from the US:   
 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the vagueness of the definition fits with the idea that the boundaries of 
politics are themselves vague and broad. What counts as a political issue is in constant flux. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for pressing this worry. Thanks to Jeroen de Ridder for helpful discussion.  
4 We could also focus on questions about the political knowledge of other key members of political systems, 
such as members of the judicial system, members of the bureaucracy, and political delegates themselves.  
5 The focus in this paper will be on descriptive political beliefs. This is to simplify the discussion. Normative 
political beliefs raise a host of questions, including whether they are genuine beliefs (as opposed to conative 
states, or a hybrid of cognitive and conative states), and whether they can count as knowledge. See also fn.16.  
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Much of the time, only a bare majority [of Americans] know which party has control 
of the Senate, some 70 percent cannot name both of their state’s senators, and the 
majority cannot name any congressional candidate in their district at the height of a 
campaign (Somin 2013, 19).  
 
A 2006 Zogby poll found that only 42 percent of Americans could even name the 
three branches of the federal government: executive, legislative, and judicial (Somin 
2013, 19)  
 
Opinions on the significance of political ignorance for theories about representative 
democracy differ radically. But there is a fair amount of consensus on the existence of 
political ignorance itself. A prominent sceptic about the very idea of representative 
democracy, Ilya Somin, claims: “The reality that most voters are often ignorant of even 
very basic political information is one of the better-established findings of social science. 
Decades of accumulated evidence reinforces this conclusion” (Somin 2013, 17). 
Meanwhile, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin—two writers who disagree with just 
about everything else Somin thinks—also claim: "If six decades of modern public opinion 
research has established anything, it is that the general public's political ignorance is 
appalling by any standard” (Ackerman & Fishkin 2004).6  
 
6 There is by no means a complete consensus on the extent of political ignorance in large representative 
democracies. Gerry Mackie (2008) argues that there is a lot of room for debate about the conclusions that 
survey studies supposedly establish. For example, how the survey questions are posed may be a big factor. 
So may the context in which the questions are asked; for example, significant differences arise when 
participants are offered a dollar for their time, or given 24 hours to respond. Also, the way accuracy (of 
participant answers) is measured is crucial. What counts as a “correct” answer or “nearly correct” answer to 
 9 
 A large number of studies go much further than suggesting people merely tend to 
have significant levels of false political beliefs (or lack of political beliefs altogether). 
These studies also seem to suggest that people have a strong tendency to be epistemically 
irrational and irresponsible in forming their political beliefs. That is to say, an extensive 
body of research indicates a significant level of biased belief formation and generally 
epistemically irresponsible habits of inquiry in the political context. Given the widely 
known phenomenon of cognitive bias in a range of our cognitive activities, this is hardly 
surprising.  
 Nevertheless, it will be helpful to have a few examples specific to the political 
context on hand. An extensive amount of research at the intersection of political science 
and cognitive psychology seems to show that:  
 
• Most people tend to discuss political issues only with those who agree with 
them (Boutyline & Willer 2017; Carlson & Settle 2016; Gerber et al. 2012; 
Mutz 2006). 
• This tendency is most pronounced among those most knowledgeable about and 
interested in politics (Caplan 2007; Mutz 2006). 
• The same goes for selection of media sources (Garrett 2009; Iyengar & Hahn 
2009; Sunstein 2009). 
 
 
certain questions can sometimes be a fuzzy thing to interpret. See Lupia and Prior (2008) for another helpful 
examination of conclusions from survey data.  
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These are examples of empirical research supporting claims about a second negative-
seeming epistemic phenomenon—one that may be causally related to the first, but which 
is also intuitively harmful in its own right (both practically and epistemically speaking).7 
  Moreover, the precise form such biases and habits of inquiry take in the political 
context appear to be exactly the sort of thing the intellectual virtues could help counter. 
That is, the above examples sound like cases of people failing to display the sorts of 
dispositions RVE is interested in theorizing about. Such experiments (and there are many 
others) seem to reveal a strong tendency in people to be precisely the opposite of, for 
example, “willing…to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to…take seriously 
a distinct cognitive standpoint” (Baehr 2011); or “disposed to recognize [their] own 
fallibility, and to recognize and value the epistemic abilities of others…”  (Battaly 2014); 
or having the “proper ability to think for [themselves] and not be… improperly dependent 
on or influenced by others” (Roberts & Wood 2007). 
 It seems that this is a prime example of an area in which we could use the help of 
RVE. Indeed, I’ve said that the political context looks like an especially good case for RVE 
to defend the ameliorative value of intellectual virtue. I turn now to argue that things are 
not quite so straightforward.   
 
4. RVE to the Rescue?   
Clear argumentative support for the ameliorative value of individual intellectual virtue is 
surprisingly elusive. To my knowledge, very little has been written specifically on the case 
 
7 Of course, the significance of these sorts of observations for our theories of representative democracy and 
democratic participation is also a subject of debate (Somin 2013; Caplan 2007; Christiano 2015; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998).   
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of political inquiry—but arguments that focus on the ameliorative value of intellectual 
virtue in the context of considerations about cognitive bias more generally are also relevant. 
Many specific examples of arguments from the literature merely conclude that the 
intellectual virtues could or might help correct for certain kinds of cognitive bias. 
 For example, Roberts and West (2015) claim: “We propose some ways that 
intellectual character virtues might help correct some of the ‘biases and heuristics’ that 
sometimes undermine our epistemic reliability” (Roberts & West 2015, 2558 my 
emphasis). This is a far cry from arguing that the intellectual character virtues will do this 
work.  
 Samuelson and Church (2014) are bolder: “We identify the proper use of Type 2 
cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the 
virtue of intellectual humility” (Samuelson & Church 2014). They focus on cognitive 
biases in general (targets include confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and the my-side bias 
(1102)) and examine four examples of behaviors and techniques that they claim help to 
mitigate epistemically harmful effects of these biases.8 These are: overt recourse to rule-
based thinking, focusing on accuracy, focusing on accountability, and taking alternative 
perspectives. They point to a common theme in the empirical literature on the role of 
motivation in these de-biasing strategies, and take this to support the idea that they each 
count as examples of a manifestation of intellectual humility (because of RVE’s standard 
motivational condition on the virtues).9  
 
8 They also explicitly acknowledge that there are worries about the effectiveness of each strategy (1103-
1106). 
9 See Zagzebski (1996, Ch.2).  
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 Regardless of whether we call them cases of intellectual humility or something else, 
a key question is: in addition to requiring a certain kind of motivation, how are any of these 
de-biasing strategies really supposed to work? To be fair, Samuelson and Church get into 
some detail here (1103-1106). But it remains far from clear whether inducing and 
sustaining this sort of “intellectual humility” is something that can be achieved effectively 
at the individual level. Samuelson and Church appear to leave this an open question (2014, 
1108).  
 There are well-known features of cognitive bias that should make us suspicious of 
the likelihood of success here. For a start, it’s very difficult to know when one is making 
biased judgments in the first place. A growing body of research shows that people have a 
kind of bias blindspot, resulting in a conviction that one’s own judgments are far less 
susceptible to bias than the judgments of others (Pronin 2007). The fact that, when people 
actually reflect on whether their judgments are biased or not, they tend to employ 
introspection to do so is one mechanism generating bias blindspot. The issue here is that 
biases operate at a subpersonal level, beyond the ken of introspection (Kahnemann 2003). 
Nathan Ballantyne (2015) helpfully outlines various other generators of bias blindspot, 
including the tendency to assume what has been called “naïve realism” (the idea that our 
experience of the world, others, and ourselves is veridical), and the motive of self-
enhancement (i.e. our tendency to see ourselves in an overly positive light) (Ballantyne 
2015, 150). It has also been shown that merely knowing about a particular bias, and that 
one is likely susceptible to it, is insufficient for reducing bias. As Kenyon points out, “I 
may very well allow that I am biased on many occasions while yet holding that this is not 
one of those occasions” (Kenyon 2014, 2535). We can regard this as a further manifestation 
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of bias blindspot. “The blindspot in this type of case is the tendency for me to judge that 
the occasion at hand is always one of the unbiased ones” (2535). Most importantly, it has 
been shown that actively trying to de-bias oneself is often either completely ineffective, or 
worse, tends to further entrench one’s biased judgment (Kenyon 2014; Ehrlinger, Gilovich 
& Ross 2005). The feeling that we’ve tried our best to de-bias tends to lead to an increased 
confidence in the relevant judgment—but any ensuing sense that one is now free from bias 
is better explained by the in-principle opacity of bias.  
 A supporter of RVE might object that these observations merely show how difficult 
it is for individuals to contribute to the cultivation of their own intellectual virtues. They 
do not problematize the role that manifestations of individual intellectual virtue might play 
in knowledge acquisition.10 In terms of our distinction from section 2, the objection would 
be that (at best) the above observations support the claim that RVE needs to be more 
causally non-agent-centered, as opposed to supporting the claim that RVE needs to be more 
constitutively non-agent-centered. In response, note that it is not clear why we should 
interpret these observations as speaking merely in favour of the former claim as opposed 
to the latter. In fact, my view is that they speak just as much in support of the latter claim. 
Take the opacity of cognitive bias. One might think that the relevant issue here is that the 
opacity of cognitive bias makes it hard to develop the habits of inquiry characteristic of 
someone who avoids certain cognitive biases. But my point is that the opacity of cognitive 
bias is an in-principle reason to think that, no matter how much an individual tries to be 
open-minded or intellectually autonomous, there are reasons to doubt that they will be 
capable, on their own, of effectively manifesting such virtues. If one wishes to be more 
 
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.  
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internalist about the concept of intellectual virtue, we can put the point a different way: no 
matter how open-minded, or conscientious, or intellectually autonomous one already is, 
there is reason to doubt that exercising these virtues can help one avoid thinking in 
cognitively biased ways in specific cases. The same point holds for observations 
concerning the inefficacy of knowledge of cognitive bias, and the tenacity of cognitive bias.  
 Beyond these generic points about the opacity and tenacity of cognitive bias, it will 
be useful to illustrate some more specific hurdles that can arise with an example. Consider, 
Tim Kenyon’s (2014) work on false polarization bias. This is the tendency to perceive 
one’s interlocutor in a disagreement as having more extreme views about the matter of 
disagreement than they in fact do. Kenyon helpfully examines various possibilities for de-
biasing in this regard. The one he identifies as most plausible involves counterfactually 
reasoning about possible arguments one might have had for the opposing view (Kenyon 
2014).11 Kenyon notes that doing this on one’s own is extremely difficult. Indeed, he 
suggests it is hopelessly unrealistic to expect such a de-biasing procedure to actually occur 
at the individual level, let alone succeed. For a start, a person’s confidence in their own 
position may make it difficult for them to so much as imagine possible ways of arriving at 
a different conclusion. Alternatively, someone who is disposed to be self-consciously 
fallible will be prone to overdo the strategy, and find too many alternative paths likely. 
Finally, social pressures are apt to have an impact on individuals’ willingness to engage in 
such counterfactual reasoning: one may fear the perception of being disloyal to a group, or 
worry that any concession one makes will be seen as a sign of weakness, for example 
(Kenyon 2014, 2542).  
 
11 Note the crossover here with Samuelson and Church’s focus on “perspective taking.” 
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 According to Kenyon, these are all reasons why dealing with false polarization bias 
is primarily a job for social institutions. In my view, the institutional proposal Kenyon 
floats isn’t particularly realistic either. He focuses on the role officially appointed advisors 
can play in helping people engage in such counterfactual reasoning (think of specialists 
brought on board to assist a hiring committee). He even imagines an informalized version 
of this gradually becoming a part of everyday practice, one in which bystanders are 
routinely asked to play the role of advisor for parties to a dispute. Regardless, the basic 
point is well taken. It would not be surprising to learn that de-biasing oneself in this 
regard—simply by exercising one’s intellectual virtue—is a worryingly difficult pursuit.12 
Nor would it be surprising to learn that this specific example is representative of a general 
phenomenon.   
 Elizabeth Anderson goes a step further and argues that factors at a wider social level 
are sometimes quite demonstrably the primary, or even sole cause of the epistemic harm 
of particular biases. For example, she argues that “shared reality bias” is often epistemically 
neutral, and sometimes even epistemically useful. Shared reality bias is “the tendency of 
individuals who interact frequently to converge in their perspectives on and judgments 
about the world” (Anderson 2012). In addition to a variety of practical benefits, it can be 
epistemically useful for individuals engaged in joint-inquiry, insofar as it keeps them “on 
the same page”. Anderson claims that “when groups of inquirers are segregated along the 
same lines that define group inequalities, the shared reality bias will tend to insulate 
members of advantaged groups from the perspectives of the systematically disadvantaged” 
 
12 In terms of my distinction in section 2, Kenyon’s suggestion is that our investigation into de-biasing 
strategies should be constitutively non-agent centered.  
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(Anderson 2012, 170). The upshot is the potential for what Fricker calls “hermeneutical 
injustice”, a particular kind of epistemic injustice: claims made by members of the 
disadvantaged group may be difficult, if not impossible, to understand for members of the 
advantaged group. As a result, in contexts created by inequality-grounding group 
segregation—a structural phenomenon—shared reality bias becomes a vector for epistemic 
injustice (Anderson 2012, 170). The point here is simply that this is one way of revealing 
how making changes at the individual level is not necessarily what matters.  
 None of this settles the question of whether we should be focusing on intellectual 
virtue or elsewhere in a general ameliorative epistemology. But these points provide some 
support for the claim that focusing on intellectual virtue in an ameliorative epistemology 
is less tractable than we might at first have thought. I turn now to some positive examples 
of ways in which we could be focusing on non-agent-centered ways of promoting 
knowledge acquisition to reinforce this idea.  
   
5. Non-Agent-Centered Ways of Promoting Knowledge-Acquisition   
First, consider the enormous literature on “information shortcuts” (Christiano 2015; 
Mackie 2008; Popkin 1994; Robertson 1976).13 Information shortcuts, roughly, are bits 
and pieces of information that enable people to make the same decisions with respect to 
some set of options that they would if they were “fully informed” about the options. For 
example, research suggests that party identification is an information shortcut, in the sense 
that knowing which party a candidate is running for can enable a person to make the same 
 
13 Research on information shortcuts in the political context intersects with the “fast and frugal heuristics” 
literature in cognitive psychology (see Bishop 2000). 
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decision about whether to vote for that candidate as they would if they knew a great deal 
about the candidate’s track record, their policies, and the likely consequences of those 
policies.14 Other examples of information shortcuts frequently discussed in the literature 
include: retrospective evaluations of the economy, comparing the likeability of one 
candidate over another, and relying on opinion leaders.15 
 Information shortcuts aren’t merely relevant to politics: they play an indispensable 
role in any society that relies on a specialized division of cognitive labor (Christiano 2015, 
257). Consider the question of whether the food you just bought from your local 
supermarket is safe to eat. Rather than doing an elaborate safety check yourself, you 
(typically) rely on the very fact that the food was sold at your supermarket in deciding 
whether it’s safe to eat. As Christiano memorably puts it, an ideal of citizenship according 
to which “every citizen should be informed in a way that is independent of how others are 
informed… is spectacularly irrelevant for all societies that have moved beyond the hunter-
gatherer stage” (Christiano 2015, 258). 
 Of course, a lot of debate surrounds the very idea of an information shortcut, and 
more specifically what effective information shortcuts in the political domain might look 
like. My intention here isn’t to settle this debate. Rather, it is to suggest that information 
shortcuts are a crucial element to take seriously in understanding the role of knowledge in 
 
14  There is of course controversy over the extent to which party identification serves as an effective 
information shortcut. My point isn’t to take a stand on whether party identification is an effective information 
shortcut; I merely use it as an example to illustrate a plausible general idea.  
15 Each of these examples comes with important qualifications. According to Sniderman et al (1991), for 
example, the likability heuristic works only for relatively sophisticated voters: “a requirement of the effective 
use of the heuristic is precisely to have organized, in a politically coherent way, both one's feelings and one's 
beliefs” (1991, 24). Getting into the details of any one specific (putative) information shortcut would take us 
too far afield.  
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a representative democracy—an element that implies the cognitive burden of democratic 
participation on individual agents is less significant than it might at first appear.  
 One way in which we could do more than theorize about intellectually virtuous 
character traits, then, is by addressing epistemological questions about what works as a 
reliable guide to what particular individuals would decide under fuller informational 
conditions. We could also try to gain a better understanding, from an epistemological 
perspective, about the conditions under which particular shortcuts count as appropriately 
employed. This latter project would require a more in-depth account of the way in which 
multiple epistemic demands of individuals’ practical lives interact, and an account of the 
respective value of meeting those demands. We could also potentially even incorporate 
insights from RVE by developing characterizations of virtuous uses of information 
shortcuts. This is certainly no small set of tasks. But that doesn’t mean that carrying it out 
is not a more realistic and effective way of doing ameliorative epistemology.  
 In what way is this proposal non-agent-centered? Isn’t the focus primarily on 
individuals and their ability to deploy heuristics to arrive at informed decisions? The 
proposal is non-agent-centered in the sense that it encourages greater focus on the way 
environmental and structural factors can do much of the work in enabling individuals to 
make informed decisions. For example, when it comes to the information shortcut of party 
identification, a significant part of the epistemic work is done by the party system itself. In 
this way, the epistemology of information shortcuts can be constitutively non-agent-
centered—it involves looking at the role that structural elements of institutions and other 
social relations themselves play in promoting knowledge acquisition in individuals.  
 19 
 As the Christiano quote intimates, many of our political beliefs come from the word 
of others (whether directly from individuals, or through information produced by 
collectives, such as a party flyer, etc.).16 A big issue here is that people of course need to 
know who to trust when it comes to acquiring political beliefs. This is true of any 
testimonial exchange. But it is especially true in the political context, given that it is 
particularly hard to determine the character (i.e. how honest, reliable, etc.) and interests of 
individuals/collectives providing political information.   
 It is hard to see how some degree of individual intellectual virtue is not important 
here. But when it comes to the ameliorative question at hand, there are other focal points 
worth noting. For one, we can focus on ways at the level of institutions to make it easier 
for people to acquire political information from others. To focus on just one example, 
Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins (1998) have developed a sophisticated approach to 
the role of institutions in political knowledge acquisition. They argue that “external 
incentive altering forces,” such as penalties for lying, likelihood of verification, and 
observable costly effort, allow people to more easily infer whether an information source 
is trustworthy or not, without exercising much judgment about the character or interests of 
the source in question. Institutions can provide these forces, and as such provide ways of 
promoting knowledge acquisition without focusing primarily on the intellectual character 
traits/abilities of individual agents. Let me explain in a bit more detail.  
 
16 This seems especially true given our restriction to “descriptive” political beliefs. It’s less clear whether and 
to what extent our normative political beliefs come from the word of others. Consider, for example, the debate 
about whether moral knowledge can be acquired by testimony. Delving into this interesting question would 
take us too far afield.  
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 The simplest example—in a non-political context—of what Lupia and McCubbins 
have in mind is the penalty of perjury in a court of law. Members of the jury know that, 
other things being equal, most people take such a penalty seriously. The penalty acts as an 
incentive not to lie. As a result, other things being equal, members of the jury can conclude 
with a fair degree of confidence that whomever it is that’s testifying in the court is telling 
the truth. This is the case regardless of what they know about the testifier’s character, or 
what the testifier’s general interests relative to the case are. Similarly, courts of law provide 
a likelihood of verification – jurors and testifiers alike know that whatever the testifier says 
in court will be subject to verification (through cross-examination and the collection of 
evidence). This significantly reduces the testifier’s incentive to say anything verifiably 
false. Thus, likelihood of verification in this context is an external incentive altering force 
enabling jurors to trust a testifier, regardless of what they know about the testifier’s 
character, or what the testifier’s general interests relative to the case are. 
 In the political context, one traditional function of the media, Lupia and 
McCubbins’ would say, is to provide the external incentive altering force of likelihood of 
verification. How well various media outlets play this role, and whether or to what extent 
they are regarded as doing so by citizens, is of course a large question in its own right. But 
the basic point for present purposes is that institutions providing a likelihood of verification 
increase the extent to which citizens can trust an information source without knowing much 
about the interests or general character of the source. Penalties for lying in the broader 
political context are of course very different from the simple case of perjury in a court of 
law. But there are natural penalties built into certain features of democratic politics: being 
revealed to be a liar usually damages one’s reputation, and can hurt one’s chances of being 
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re-elected, for example. Again, the basic point is that institutions providing such penalties 
increase the extent to which citizens can trust an information source without knowing much 
about the interests or general character of the source.17  
 Another way, then, in which we could do more than theorize about intellectually 
virtuous character traits is by developing an epistemological account of what works as an 
external incentive altering force, and also what sorts of institutions can provide them 
(courts of law, advertising regulations, etc.). This would also seem to require theorizing 
about the conditions under which instances of informational exchange count as 
epistemically appropriate in such institutionally constrained contexts. We could further 
incorporate insights from RVE by developing characterizations of intellectually virtuous 
inquiry in the context of institutionally facilitated external incentive altering forces. This is 
 
17 The notion of observable costly effort, and the way this can serve as an external incentive altering force, is 
a bit more complex, and raises a host of questions it would take us too far afield to get into here. But the basic 
idea is as follows. If as a group we face a decision about how we want to organize ourselves (as in the case 
of an election), from the fact that someone is putting a lot of effort and resources into making a proposal for 
how we might organize ourselves, other things being equal, we can infer that their proposal differs in some 
significant way from the status quo. Otherwise, to put it roughly, why put significant effort into making the 
proposal? The key point is that we can infer this without knowing anything about the contents of the proposed 
change, or any of the specific ways in which it differs from the status quo. So, if one is happy with the status 
quo, and observes someone making a costly effort, other things being equal one can make an effective 
decision about whether to accept the proposal on this basis. Electoral institutions can have such effects. For 
example, campaign-finance disclosure laws require that party campaigns, as well as lobbyists, identify in a 
publicly available way all significant financial contributors and how much was contributed by each. 
According to Lupia and McCubbins, this is a way of making transparent the observable costly effort that a 
party—and the specific special interest groups supporting it—are making in the service of getting their 
message out there. “If a person is reasonably happy with the status quo, and would thus like to see only a 
small change in policy, and if she observes the sponsor of a ballot initiative spending several million dollars 
to affect the election, then, without any further information, she can infer that the initiative proposes a very 
large change in the status quo and that she should oppose it” (Lupia & McCubbins 2000, 60). 
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perhaps an even more daunting task than adequately developing our understanding of 
information shortcuts within an RVE. But, again, that does not mean that carrying it out is 
a not more realistic and effective way of doing ameliorative epistemology.  
 
6. Political Inquiry and RVE  
Taking stock, I’ve suggested that there are reasons to be pessimistic about the ameliorative 
value of individual intellectual virtue in the political context. I’ve also explored two 
examples of non-agent-centered ways of promoting knowledge acquisition in this context. 
I think this reveals ways in which RVE focuses too narrowly on individual virtue in its 
ameliorative aims. But all of this raises an important question. In what way, exactly, are 
considerations about political inquiry relevant to an evaluation of RVE? After all, RVE is 
a theory of human cognition in general. It doesn’t aim to provide an account of the way 
people think about politics, or any other topic in particular. Moreover, one might think that 
there’s something unfair about holding a general theory up to scrutiny vis-à-vis what seems 
like a fairly special sort of case. Perhaps something about the very nature of politics—
whether it’s the heated emotional issues involved, or the role of values in shaping people’s 
views—makes it particularly hostile to virtuous conduct of any kind.  
 There are at least two main reasons why the case of political inquiry is relevant, 
and interesting to focus on, in an assessment of RVE. First, the context of politics provides 
an area of inquiry that it seems RVE has been especially interested in theorizing about. 
There are many areas of inquiry a better understanding of which does not seem to require 
theorizing about person level intellectual virtues. For example, consider finding out what’s 
in the fridge. Cases of simple perceptual knowledge have been a major sticking point for 
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RVE in the context of questions about the relationship between intellectual virtue and 
knowledge. Are the intellectual virtues necessary for knowledge? Are they sufficient? 
(Greco 2010, Sosa 2015; cf. Zagzebski 1996, Baehr 2011). The general response on behalf 
of RVE has been to claim that the intellectual virtues are only necessary for—or especially 
salient in explanations of the acquisition of—“high-grade” kinds of knowledge. 
 In his discussion of high-grade knowledge, Jason Baehr (2011) provides three 
cases—involving a biologist, detective, and historian respectively—as paradigm cases of 
knowledge that require the exercise of intellectual virtue:  
 
In these scenarios, reaching the truth is not simply or even primarily a matter of 
having good eyesight, a good memory, or making valid logical inferences. Rather, 
the individuals in question reach the truth because they exhibit certain attitudes or 
character traits. These traits seem to account most saliently for or to best explain why 
the individuals form true beliefs. The biologist, for example, discovers why the 
relevant bird species has altered its migratory course on account of his patient, 
focused inquiry and his refined powers of observation and discrimination. The 
reporter uncovers a corporate scandal because he is intellectually courageous and 
autonomous. And the historian accepts and acknowledges a major error in her work 
because of her intellectual openness, honesty, humility, and general love of truth 
(Baehr 2011, 54).  
 
Political knowledge is not the sort of thing that we can acquire simply, or even primarily, 
through good eyesight, good memory, or making valid logical inferences. On the face of 
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it, it seems to be much more sophisticated than that. It seems to require considering various 
viewpoints, weighing evidence for and against certain claims, not jumping to conclusions, 
and so on.18 Political knowledge seems like a paradigm case of what RVE theorists would 
regard as high-grade knowledge. Again, this is exactly the sort of area RVE has tended to 
focus on as a result of disputes or disagreements with more traditionally-minded 
epistemologists. In other words, it would seem that the sort of knowledge RVE theorists 
themselves claim RVE is most important for is the kind of knowledge precisely at stake 
here. So it is particularly interesting and important in a general assessment of RVE.  
 Secondly, the example of political knowledge is just one instance of a much more 
general phenomenon. Namely, it is an example of a domain of inquiry in which agents tend 
to feel they have little incentive to make a cognitive effort.19 Note that few theorists claim 
that people are politically ignorant because they are generally stupid or lazy. Rather, many 
agree with the Anthony Downs’ (1957) idea that political ignorance is instrumentally 
rational. In particular, according to Downs (and others) the rationality of political ignorance 
is an upshot of the nature of voting in a representative democracy with millions of voters. 
It’s an upshot of the fact that the chances of your vote being a deciding factor in an election 
 
18 The previous section’s discussion of the role of non-agent-centered factors in the acquisition of political 
knowledge potentially mitigates the extent to which this really is the case. Moreover, some of the examples 
of political ignorance from earlier (7) may seem like failures of basic cognitive faculties (such as memory), 
as opposed to anything “high grade”. But the claim here need not be that all political knowledge is high-
grade. As long as political knowledge generally requires more than basic use of one’s innate cognitive 
faculties (such as sense perception, or memory), my point goes through. This seems very plausible. RVE 
theorists would themselves likely agree with this description of political knowledge.   
19 On the face of it, political knowledge is indeed a valuable kind of knowledge and people of course have an 
incentive to acquire it (not least because of its role in citizens’ ability to hold elected officials to account, for 
example). This is why I restrict the phenomenon at issue to cases of perceived low incentive to make a 
cognitive effort.   
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or referendum are near zero. The idea is that this has a significant impact on your incentive 
to get informed about whatever it is you are voting on.20  
 Regardless of whether political knowledge is actually valuable, and how much 
cognitive effort achieving it actually requires, contexts of perceived low incentive for 
cognitive effort tend to arise when agents feel that beliefs they form about a particular 
matter have little chance of affecting their practical life, or the practical lives of others.  
 To illustrate with a contrast, consider making a big purchase. Perhaps it’s a new 
home, or a new car. People tend to think (however implicitly) that what they believe about 
factors relevant to a big purchase has a high likelihood of making an impact on their 
practical lives (consider factors such as which car gets the best mileage, or which house 
has the better property value, etc.). So, they perceive themselves as having a high incentive 
to make a cognitive effort. Other examples of perceived low incentive for cognitive effort 
contexts might be forming beliefs about religion, basic science, world geography, or history 
(see Somin 2013, 77 for interesting stats on ignorance in these domains). If that is correct, 
then inquiry with a perceived low incentive for cognitive effort is a pervasive phenomenon.  
 What’s significant about such contexts is that, in the absence of an incentive to 
make a cognitive effort, they are contexts in which biased cognition and other epistemically 
harmful modes of inquiry are apt to creep in. It is plausible that a perception of low 
incentive to make a cognitive effort is a core part of the explanation of why, in the political 
 
20 This is contentious and has generated a lot of debate in its own right. For example, Mackie (2008) argues 
that Downs’ idea presupposes a mistaken model of why people vote in the first place. Mackie argues for a 
“contributory model,” according to which the aim of voting isn’t merely to get someone to win, but also to 
show that whomever you’re voting for, even if they lose, has a certain mandate behind them. Regardless, if 
true, Downs’ idea would provide a pretty compelling explanation of the amount of political ignorance studies 
seem to reveal. 
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context, people tend to lack significant amounts of knowledge/concern for epistemically 
appropriate ways of forming beliefs. If political inquiry is just one example of a domain in 
which this phenomenon is at work, then any lessons we learn in this case may apply to a 
wide range of examples of human inquiry. As such, the case of political inquiry is 
particularly interesting and important in a general assessment of RVE. 
 
7. Conclusion  
I am not suggesting that the intellectual virtues have no role in ameliorative epistemology. 
There is no reason to think any one of the proposals considered above must be pursued at 
the expense of any of the others. Indeed, there is good reason to think that a challenge such 
as promoting political knowledge acquisition must be met on multiple fronts.21 Perhaps the 
best way for RVE to respond to the claim that the political context threatens to expose RVE 
as focusing too narrowly on individual virtue is by embedding the mapping project within 
non-agent-centered epistemic efforts. I’ve given two illustrations of the sort of thing I have 
in mind. There is much more room for thinking about how such developments might work, 
and that is a worthwhile project.  
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